KL:JSB.KL:Jentayu SustainablesJentayu Sustainables rescheduled its EGM to Dec 4 (from Oct 22), to be held at noon at Menara Felda, Kuala Lumpur.
President Donald Trump has spent much of his second term recasting Washington as a hands-on market player. In June, his administration secured a “golden share” in U.S. Steel to retain control even after its sale to Japan’s Nippon Steel. Two months later, the government took a 10% stake in struggling chipmaker Intel. Tariffs are central to this strategy, doubling as leverage in dealmaking—most notably when Pfizer agreed in September to sell prescriptions directly to consumers via TrumpRx in exchange for tariff relief.
Nothing, however, matches the potential day-to-day impact of Trump’s push to shift TikTok’s U.S. ownership from China’s ByteDance to a consortium of American investors. An executive order signed in September framed the plan as a way to protect data, privacy, and users from foreign influence—while generating significant gains for U.S. backers.
Beyond ownership, the government’s operational role looms large. Working with Oracle, officials would help build a U.S.-specific version of TikTok, oversee safety and data safeguards, train the recommendation algorithm, and review source code. The order also empowers the Attorney General to receive information from the new venture, with “trusted security partners” able to share data across agencies—signaling deep federal visibility into the platform.
The deal’s fate remains uncertain and requires approval from Beijing, which hasn’t endorsed it. Tensions have grown: Trump reacted to fresh Chinese export controls with new tariff threats and hinted he could skip a meeting with President Xi Jinping. A similar tariff clash derailed an earlier iteration of the TikTok plan in April.
If finalized, the arrangement could give the administration unusual influence over content rules and law-enforcement requests—authority other social platforms have typically resisted. Recent history shows how ownership shapes moderation: Elon Musk’s overhaul of Twitter (now X) relaxed prior policies, and Meta adjusted its standards after Trump’s re-election. Trump has said he wants TikTok to treat all viewpoints fairly, even as he’s openly mused about favoring his own.
Security concerns continue to drive the push. U.S. officials worry ByteDance could be compelled under Chinese law to share data or tune algorithms for propaganda—fears that fueled a bipartisan law demanding a TikTok spin-off or ban. Trump, once a fierce critic, now supports a sale to mostly American investors, with ByteDance retaining a small stake. A senior official has said the U.S. government itself wouldn’t hold equity or appoint a board member.
Oracle cofounder Larry Ellison—an ally and major Republican donor—has a prominent role securing the venture’s infrastructure, and Trump has said the Murdoch family is among the investors. Vice President JD Vance argues that placing TikTok with established U.S. institutions will align decisions with business interests rather than a foreign state. Still, in an era when the line between public power and private influence is blurred, skeptics question whether shifting ownership alone will insulate a platform used by half of Americans from political pressure—whether from Beijing or from powerful U.S. stakeholders.
Keppel REIT’s latest deal is drawing mixed reviews. The trust will buy a 75% stake in Australia’s freehold Top Ryde City Shopping Centre, a move pitched as strategic diversification into retail that modestly lifts distributions per unit (DPU) and broadens portfolio resilience. Yet the purchase also dilutes its hallmark exposure to Singapore’s prime offices—often the main attraction for local investors.
As at June 30, Keppel REIT’s S$9.4 billion portfolio was almost entirely offices, with Singapore assets—stakes in Marina Bay Financial Centre, Ocean Financial Centre, One Raffles Quay and Keppel Bay Tower—making up 78.6%. The manager said on Oct 8 it currently holds only about 100,000 sq ft of retail space within office assets; post-deal, retail will be 4.2% of an enlarged S$9.8 billion portfolio.
The A$393.8 million (S$334.8 million) purchase price matches an independent valuation. Including fees, stamp duty and expenses, total cost is A$427.4 million (S$363.5 million). Funding will be 60% via perpetuals and a new-unit placement, with the remaining 40% in AUD debt. Pro forma, the transaction would have raised 2024 DPU by 0.9%, trimmed end-2024 NAV by 0.8%, and left aggregate leverage roughly unchanged at 41.6%. Keppel REIT has since placed nearly 115 million new units at S$0.983 to raise S$113 million; the pro forma assumed a larger, cheaper issue at S$0.90.
Sourcing is notable. Keppel REIT is partnering ASX-listed MA Financial Group, which will hold 25% and act as property and asset manager for Keppel REIT’s stake. Fees to MA Financial will be paid out of the REIT manager’s entitlements, though the manager retains a 0.5% divestment fee on any sale. The REIT highlights this co-ownership model—used with Mirvac at 255 George Street, 8 Chifley Square and the David Malcolm Justice Centre—as a way to tap partners’ local expertise while keeping oversight.
More diversification may follow. Low cap rates for Singapore offices make accretive buys difficult, pushing listed REITs to seek higher yields overseas. Keppel REIT books cap rates of 3.25%–3.4% for its flagship Singapore towers, versus 5.88%–7.25% for Australian assets such as 8 Exhibition Street (Melbourne) and 6 Giffnock Avenue (NSW). Still, investors worry about foreign-market volatility and currency drag: over five years, the AUD, KRW and JPY have weakened ~12%, 23% and 30% against the SGD.
Keppel REIT units trade at an annualised 1H 2025 yield of 5.6% and a 19% discount to NAV—reasonable for a prime office landlord. Even so, unitholders will be watching closely to see whether the shift toward retail and overseas markets enhances long-term value or erodes the Singapore-office edge that defines the franchise.
U.S.–China Tensions Put Cooking Oil in the Crosshairs
America’s stock of trade disputes with China may soon include cooking oil. President Donald Trump said the U.S. is weighing a halt to Chinese imports as “retribution” for Beijing’s reluctance to buy American soybeans. While he didn’t specify, the likely target is used cooking oil (UCO)—a waste stream from homes and restaurants that’s refined into biofuels such as renewable diesel.
UCO imports are politically fraught. U.S. farm groups and some lawmakers argue low-priced foreign feedstocks undercut demand for domestically grown oils used in biofuels. The U.S. became a net UCO importer by early 2022, but shipments from China have already fallen this year. A formal ban would therefore be largely symbolic.
Trump’s threat followed an October post on Truth Social accusing China of shunning U.S. soybeans—America’s largest farm export—and harming U.S. growers. China, the world’s top soybean buyer, uses the crop for animal feed and cooking oil. It sourced roughly a fifth of its 2024 imports from the U.S. but has withheld purchases since May 2025, turning instead to South American suppliers, leaving U.S. farmers facing weak prices and swollen inventories.
For China, a U.S. stop on UCO imports would likely be manageable. The U.S. was the top destination for Chinese UCO in 2024 at a record 1.27 million tonnes, yet volumes slid this year after Beijing removed tax relief on overseas UCO sales and Washington raised tariffs. January–July shipments totaled about 387,000 tonnes, roughly half the prior year’s pace. Chinese traders might face short-term pressure—rerouting to Europe, accepting lower prices, or holding more inventory—but UCO revenues are small compared with soybean trade.
The U.S. picture is more complicated. Despite Trump’s claim that America can “easily” supply its own cooking oil, higher federal biofuel blending goals imply continued reliance on imported feedstocks. Domestic processing capacity is a bottleneck: the U.S. cannot crush enough oilseeds to satisfy both food and fuel needs.
U.S. resistance to Chinese UCO has also been fueled by quality and integrity concerns. Industry groups and lawmakers urged tighter verification amid speculation—unproven—that some UCO shipments were blended with fresh palm oil. Cheap UCO surged into the U.S. in 2023 as producers chased state and federal incentives for low-carbon fuels, intensifying fights over eligibility for the Inflation Reduction Act’s 45Z clean-fuel tax credit. Because UCO has a low carbon-intensity score, it often earns higher credits than domestic soybean oil.
Policy has already shifted. In January, the outgoing Biden administration excluded biofuels made with foreign feedstocks from 45Z eligibility. In July, Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act went further, limiting the credit to U.S.-controlled producers using North American feedstocks. With successive 90-day U.S.–China trade truces set to be tested again in November, UCO has become a fresh—and politically charged—front in a broader economic confrontation.
America’s Market Balancing Act: AI Euphoria, Dollar Doubts, and the Risk of a Harsher Reckoning
The U.S. stock market has whipsawed on renewed trade tensions yet sits near record highs, propelled by AI-fueled optimism reminiscent of the late-1990s tech boom. Innovation is undeniably lifting productivity, but the rally’s froth raises the risk of a painful correction—one that could hit harder and wider than the dot-com bust.
Exposure to U.S. equities is far larger today. American households have ramped up stock holdings over the past 15 years, and foreign investors—especially in Europe—have piled in, aided by a strong dollar. That tight linkage means any sharp U.S. downturn would echo globally.
A crash on the scale of 2000 could erase more than US$20 trillion in U.S. household wealth—about 70% of 2024 GDP—threatening consumption already weaker than pre-dot-com levels. A 3.5-point hit to consumption could shave roughly two points from GDP growth before investment effects. Abroad, losses could top US$15 trillion—near 20% of the rest of the world’s GDP—far exceeding early-2000s spillovers.
Historically, a crisis lifted the dollar as investors sought safety, cushioning foreign consumers holding dollar assets. That backstop looks less certain: despite policies that might have supported it, the dollar has slipped against major currencies, and investors are increasingly hedging dollar risk—signaling waning confidence.
Doubts about U.S. institutional strength amplify the concern. Questions over the Federal Reserve’s independence, alongside legal and political cross-currents, could further erode trust in the dollar and American assets. Meanwhile, growth faces headwinds: tariffs, China’s critical-minerals controls, and geopolitical uncertainty—all with record government debt limiting room for fiscal rescue compared with 2000.
Escalating tariff skirmishes risk broader damage as supply chains bind most economies to the U.S. and China. Avoiding erratic policy—particularly moves that threaten central-bank independence—remains essential to prevent a market rupture.
The world also needs new sources of growth. For years, productivity gains and returns have clustered in a few regions—chiefly America—leaving asset prices and capital flows perched on a narrow base. Stronger, more balanced growth elsewhere—Europe advancing its single market, emerging economies sustaining reforms—would widen the foundation and steady global markets.
Bottom line: a crash today would likely be deeper and more global than the brief downturn after the dot-com bust. With more wealth at risk and less policy space, the structural vulnerabilities are greater. Preparing for harsher global consequences is prudent.
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